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RELATION BETWEEN ANXIETY AND
THE PERCEPTION
OF EXPRESSED EMOTION
Kimberly A. Solomon
Dr. Angela Staples, Mentor
ABSTRACT
This study investigated the relation between anxiety, expressed
emotion, and perceived emotion in a face-to-face interaction task.
Students (N = 56) participated in a dyadic three-phase laboratory
task that involved: (1) writing about a remembered event (either
anxious or serene; randomly assigned), (2) engaging in a face-toface interaction task, and (3) completing personality and mood
questionnaires. Preliminary findings suggest experimentally
induced anxiety may not play a role in listener-speaker agreement
about expressed/perceived affective information during face-toface interactions. Further analysis will consider the role of context
and personality on listener-speaker agreement.

INTRODUCTION
Communication is one of many tools we use to navigate
our existence. Humans have evolved to be incredibly social
individuals, to the point that if essential communication skills are
not properly developed in early childhood, risk of psychopathology
later in life increases (Cannon et al., 2002). While the concept
of social interaction appears to be simple at first—think, speak,
listen, respond—when observed closely, it becomes significantly
more complicated. Using the Interaction Model of Communication
(Figure 1 below), social interactions can be broken down into
several components in which communication is a transaction with
at least one sender and one receiver, a medium in which
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the transaction takes place (e.g., talk, letter, email, text message,
etc.), and a channel or delivery method for the chosen medium,
if necessary (Richmond, McCroskey, & Payne, 1987; University
of Minnesota Libraries, 2016). It is the job of the senders to:
(1) determine precisely what they want to convey, and to (2)
conceptualize an effective way of getting their message across.
This transmission of information about the senders’ internal state
is known as encoding, and thus the senders themselves are often
referred to as encoders (Russell, Bachorowski, & FernándezDols, 2003). In response, receivers must analyze the information
given to them and attempt to make sense of the message that was
to be communicated. This process of recognizing sent information
and conceiving potential meaning from it is known as decoding,
and, as with encoders, the receivers taking part in this process are
often referred to as decoders (Russell et al., 2003).
Just as individuals are different, there are differences
in an individual’s ability to encode and decode messages.
Research suggests that the majority of people think they may
be more proficient communicators than they actually are, due to
the “Illusion of Transparency” (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec,
1998). This common cognitive bias leads individuals to believe
they are being much more explicit than they really are, and that
others are easily able to understand their encoded internal state
(e.g., thoughts, emotions, intentions), even though only some
information has been conveyed, and that small amounts of
information remain ambiguous. While this may appear to be an
unavoidable, yet relatively harmless byproduct of communication,
allowing discrepancies like this to continue without being
addressed may put individuals at a notable disadvantage. While
encoders themselves are likely to be unaware that their efforts to
communicate effectively have fallen short, the decoder within that
interaction is left to deal with lingering ambiguities in meaning.
Those with superior skills in encording messages have a distinct
advantage over their less skilled counterparts. Research by Human
and Biesanz (2013) suggests that people who are more “judgeable”
and more easily decoded tend to be more psychologically welladjusted, are better liked, and possess greater relationship
satisfaction than their peers. There are observable boosts in
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personal well-being and social standing in people who are able to
improve their skills in encoding messages.

Figure 1. The Interaction Model of Communication (University of Minnesota Libraries, 2016)

Communication is further complicated by the factors of
noise and context (Schramm, Chaffee, & Rogers, 1997). Both
can be broken down into two additional subtypes—physical and
psychological. Noise includes anything that influences effective
communication in such a way that it alters the interpretation
(decoding) of a conversation. While this aspect of communication
is usually overlooked, noise can have a profound impact both
on our perception of interactions with others and our analysis of
our own communication proficiency (University of Minnesota
Libraries, 2016). Physical noise can include things such as others
speaking in the immediate area, background music, an unexpected
noise, and a conversation partner acknowledging someone outside
of the conversation. Psychological noise results from preconceived
notions individuals bring to conversations. Examples include
things such as racial/ethnic stereotypes, reputations, biases, and
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assumptions. Without acknowledgement and deliberate effort,
this type of communication barrier is difficult to avoid. Context
refers to factors that influence the outcome of communication
that are outside the realm of control for those participating in
it. Physical context can include things such as the size, layout,
temperature, and lighting of the interaction environment, while
psychological context focuses on the mental factors that can
affect communication, including emotions, stress, and even love
(University of Minnesota Libraries, 2016).
Communication happens both verbally and nonverbally.
Everything from the encoders’ tone of voice to their body
movements may affect communication, and it can be difficult
to encode intention accurately while simultaneously decoding
physical messages. To give a simple example, some cultures
perceive the crossing of arms as a sign of boredom or anger, and
thus when someone takes this stance, it communicates a generally
closed-off attitude (Richmond et al., 1987). Others may assume
this posture simply because it is more comfortable for them. As
Mullins and Duke (2004) explained in their research, interpersonal
exchanges are crucial for a functioning society. In order for such
exchanges to be both natural and successful, individuals must be
adept at encoding and decoding both verbal and nonverbal cues to
facilitate successful communication.
Research examining the nonverbal communication of
a person’s affective state has been heavily studied for 40 years,
the vast majority of which has focused solely on decoding ability
(Hall, Mast, & West, 2016). This holds true despite Kenny
and La Voie’s (1984) assertion that individual differences in a
communication partner’s decoding ability account for only 1/20th
of the impact that the encoder’s ability has on communication
accuracy. Surprisingly, the use of face-to-face research models is
uncommon in research assessing nonverbal accuracy. While this
type of design is less frequently used, face-to-face models are
more ecologically and externally valid than thin-slice studies that
attempt to infer decoding accuracy from observing video recordings
of an interaction (Raymond, 2016). Face-to-face studies provide
more information about the full communication event—requiring
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participants to act as both encoders and decoders, as they would
be in everyday situations.
Differences in cognition may also present an additional
barrier to effective communication. The Illusion of Transparency
(Gilovich et al., 1998) describes encoders’ assumptions that
encoders are able to understand their mental state, and the
decoders’ assumptions that they correctly understand the mental
state of the encoder. Neurodivergence and mental illness may also
provide challenges to both the encoding and decoding of messages.
When one considers communication through its psychological
context, anxiety may prove to be a meaningful barrier. A study
by Kessler et al. (2005) suggests that approximately 28.8% of the
U.S. adult population is affected by some type of anxiety disorder,
making anxiety the most prevalent mental illness, while some
12.1% of American adults have been specifically diagnosed with
Social Phobia, or as it is more commonly known, Social Anxiety
Disorder (SAD; Kessler et al., 2005).
SAD is categorized by its extreme fear of being scrutinized
by others and subsequently being judged or humiliated by others’
judgements (Kring, Johnson, Davison, & Neale, 2012). While
often compared to shyness, individuals who suffer from SAD
can experience symptoms severe enough to disrupt their ability
to complete everyday tasks. As we know, one such daily activity
is communication, and it is currently unclear what role, if any,
anxiety plays within the context of face-to-face interactions.
Because nonverbal communication is theorized to make up
anywhere between 65-93% of all communicated meaning
(Richmond et al., 1987), using nonverbal accuracy as a potential
signifier of communicative ability would make theoretical sense,
and the lack of research examining this form of communication
from an anxious-speaker’s perspective is surprising. Researchers
have studied visual attendance and eye behavior to attempt to
understand how stimuli are interpreted by anxious individuals
(Anderson et al., 2013; Buckner, Maner, & Schmidt, 2008). Some
evidence suggests that individuals with generalized SAD exhibit
low levels of visual attendance, both generally and temporally,
towards positive social stimuli, but appear to have no significant
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differences in visual attendance when presented with negative
social stimuli (Anderson et al., 2013). Others have found evidence
to the contrary; research by Buckner et al. (2008) suggests that
individuals with higher levels of social anxiety appear to have
difficulty disengaging from negative social stimuli when compared
to their level of attendance towards positive social stimuli. If these
findings hold true, prolonged attendance towards negative stimuli
has the risk of possibly exacerbating anxiety symptoms within
individuals. To my knowledge, there is as of yet no published
research examining the manner in which difficulty to disengage
from negative stimuli contributes to anxiety symptoms.
It would be reasonable to assume that with possible
increased levels of anxiety, affected individuals would have
difficulty accurately decoding the social stimuli they are observing.
Despite this assumption, and contrary to what was perceived about
social anxiety and the ability to decode nonverbal cues accurately,
the ability of anxious individuals to identify specific emotions
appears to be unaffected by anxiety level (Mullins & Duke, 2004).
Alternately, it could also be assumed that individuals experiencing
heightened levels of anxiety would exhibit some external
indication of their current state, and this would be noticeable by
their communication partner. Harrigan and Taing (1997) found
evidence against this assumption, suggesting that, when looking
only at facial expression and excluding other communicative
elements (e.g., body and voice), people show decreased accuracy
in identifying the level of anxiety in others. This could be due
to anxious individuals being aware of how society expects them
to present nonverbally (e.g., fidgety, avoiding eye contact, not
smiling, etc.), and thus try to mask their symptoms by being
inconsistent with these social nonverbal stereotypes. Other than
the evidence presented, literature examining communication
success with anxious individuals as encoders and unaffected
individuals as decoders is scant.
Questions therefore remain concerning the overall
nonverbal communication ability of individuals with anxiety.
Evidence contradicts the assumption that individuals with
anxiety experience difficulty in receiving and decoding nonverbal
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information. The limited available research suggests, however, that
anxious individuals exhibit some degree of decreased accuracy
when encoding and expressing themselves nonverbally. Because
communication is multi-dimensional and requires accuracy both
in encoding and decoding a message, more research is needed to
fully understand the challenges posed by anxiety, especially in
instances where the encoder struggles with SAD.
This study hypothesized (1) that individuals with
significant levels of anxiety have no difficulty accurately decoding
the nonverbal cues of others, regardless of anxiety levels or type
(positive, negative, or neutral) of stimuli presented. A second
hypothesis (2) stated that individuals with significant levels of
anxiety have altered encoding ability of their own nonverbal
cues when compared to individuals with low to nonexistent
levels of anxiety.
Understanding how anxiety affects nonverbal
communication has the potential to lead to more effective
treatment. Clinicians may be able to apply this information to
their practice and ensure that they are encoding the message
they intend to share with their patients, while at the same time
making sure they are accurately decoding what their patients are
attempting to communicate. On a more general scale, if anxiety
does distort nonverbal perceptions, and anxious people perceive
this, then they may be able to use this information to alleviate
some of the symptoms of anxiety they experience in a social
situation. Increasing awareness of how SAD distorts perception
may permit anxious individuals to address social situations with
greater objectivity and calmer responses.

METHODOLOGY
Participants
This study included a sample of 56 students from Eastern
Michigan University (EMU), between 18 and 38 years old (M =
21.56; SD = 4.47; 74% female). Participants were recruited using
posters seeking “individuals that have trouble giving speeches.”
This recruitment strategy ideally yielded a sample with varying
degrees of social anxiety, without giving away the nature of the
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study. Participants were also obtained using EMU’s Psychology
Research Sign-Up System (SONA), a Cloud-based system that
gives psychology students information on studies currently being
conducted by other students or professors and permits students
to participate in research of interest. Participants were fluent in
conversational English, per the procedural requirements to read
an assigned script and carry out a conversation with another
participant. Participants provided their informed consent, and
procedures were approved by the Eastern Michigan University
Institutional Review Board.

Measures
The study employed three different scales to measure
anxiety: (1) the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS),
(2) the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNES), and (3)
Visual Analog Scale (VAS). The study also used the Berkeley
Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ), to identify an individual’s
emotional expressivity.
The SADS (Watson & Friend, 1969) is a questionnaire
including 28 true or false items (e.g., “I try to avoid situations which
force me to be very sociable”; “It is easy for me to relax when I am
with strangers,” etc.) developed to quantify social anxiety. Scores
are based on participant responses, and higher scores indicate
greater social anxiety. Two aspects of anxiety are measured: four
experiences distress, discomfort, fear, anxiety and the avoidance of
social situations. The SADS instrument has been valued for having
high reliability with its internal consistency at .94 and the testreliability ranging from .68 (Watson & Friend, 1969).
Often used in tandem with the SADS questionnaire, the
FNES was also used in this study (Watson & Friend, 1969). This
instrument is a questionnaire including 30 items (e.g., “I rarely
worry about what kind of impression I am making on someone”;
“I am afraid others will not approve of me,” etc.) in a true or
false response format that measures discomfort and distress in
interpersonal interactions, looking specifically at apprehension
in subjects when presented with the threat of being negatively
evaluated. Scale scores range from 0 (low FNE) to 30 (high FNE).
The Cronbach alpha rating for the internal reliability of the FNES
questionnaire is reported to be anywhere between .94 to .98. The
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test-retest reliability was reported to range between .78 to .94,
according to Watson and Friend (1969).
The study also used a VAS, which was used to quantify
anxiety levels of participants in a self-report measure that allows
them to indicate how they are feeling at a particular moment. Often
used to measure the intensity or frequency of various symptoms,
VAS is an instrument that tries to measure a characteristic or
attitude that is believed to range across a continuum of values and
cannot easily be directly measured, such as pain, happiness, or
anxiety (Gould, Kelly, Goldstone, & Gammon, 2001). From the
participants’ perspective, this range appears continuous allowing
them to rate their experience in a way that does not take discrete
jumps, such as a categorization of “none,” “mild,” “moderate,”
or “severe” would suggest. The simplest way to administer this
measure is a straight line of fixed length, usually 100 mm. Defined
at the ends of each line are the extreme limits of the emotion being
measured, oriented from left (“none at all”) to right (“most I’ve
ever felt”; Streiner & Norman, 1989). Participants indicate on
the line the point that they feel best represents their perception
of their current state, and VAS score is determined by measuring
to the point marked. Test–retest reliability has been shown to be
good, but slightly higher among literate (r = 0.94, p = 0.001) than
illiterate individuals (r = 0.71, p = 0.001; Kahl & Cleland, 2005).
Without an absolute way to compare the factors assessed by
VAS scales, criterion validity cannot be evaluated. For construct
validity, for people with a variety of rheumatic diseases, the pain
VAS has been shown to be highly correlated with a 5-point verbal
descriptive scale (nil to very severe) and a numeric rating scale
(with response options from no pain to unbearable pain), with
correlations ranging from 0.71–0.78 and 0.62–0.91, respectively
(Aun, Lam, & Collett, 1986).
The final measure used within this study was the BEQ,
a 16-item self-report questionnaire employing a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
This questionnaire has been shown to have high validity and
reliability (Gross & John, 1995) in identifying an individual’s
emotional expressivity. Emotional expressivity is contextualized
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by behavioral (e.g., facial, vocal, postural) changes associated
with the process of experiencing emotion, and the measure itself
is divided into three distinct facets: positive expressivity (PE),
negative expressivity (NE), and the general strength of emotional
impulses (IS). Items in the questionnaire include statements such
as: “It is difficult for me to hide my fear” (NE), “When I’m happy,
my feelings show” (PE), and “My body reacts very strongly to
emotional situations” (IS). Scores can be calculated for each of
the three facets individually, with higher scores indicating higher
degrees to which emotion-response tendencies are expressed
as manifest behavior and a higher general strength of these
tendencies; the three facets can also be combined to form a single
emotional expressivity scale. Including this measure allowed the
study to consider individual differences in baseline expressivity
as an additional variable in anxiety, as well as in encoding and
decoding accuracy.

Procedure
Participants who either responded to an advertisement
or signed up through SONA came to a research laboratory
in dyads and began the experiment by seating themselves at
one of two available computer desks. The desks were already
randomly identified as “first” or “second” participant. Each
participant then completed informed consent documents and
four self-report questionnaires (SADS, FNES, BEQ, and VAS:
the first three electronically, and the fourth on paper) to create
a baseline of their anxiety levels and emotional expressivity.
The participants were subsequently assigned to one of two
groups: (a) an anxiety-induced experimental group or (b) a
control group. Both participants were then told they had five
minutes to complete a reflection task, which asked them to
read their assigned prompt on the computer, then to write as
much or as little as they felt comfortable with, but to spend the
entirety of the five minutes being mindful about the prompt
and what they wrote. Individuals assigned to the experimental
group were instructed to recall a time in which they felt
anxious, while participants in the control group were instead
instructed to recall a time in which they felt serene. Once time
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ended for that task, both participants were asked to repeat a
VAS measure to determine whether or not the induction task
was successful.
In a method similar to that used by Raymond (2016),
both participants were randomly assigned a set of six laminated
cards. Each card contained instructions for the task, a “context”
in which the participants should imagine themselves, a
description of the emotions they should display about that
situation, referred to as their “intent,” and a statement to be
spoken aloud. Participants were instructed to read the first
two parts of the card (“context” and “intent”) silently. They
were then instructed to say the statement out loud to their
partner, with the goal of permitting their partner to interpret
the statement’s intent with the aid of their nonverbal displays
(e.g., tone of voice, body language, etc.). The assigned intent
on each card was also randomly assigned, fitting into one of
three categories: “positive,” “negative,” or “neutral.”
For evaluation, participants received a sheet that aligned
with their partner’s speaking order and were told to record what
intent they thought their partner was trying to convey with their
spoken statement. The evaluation sheet listed the three potential
emotional intents (“positive,” “negative,” or “neutral”) their partner
could have been assigned to convey. Participants identified their
partner’s perceived intent as conveyed by the spoken statement
and their nonverbal displays. The paired participants took turns
speaking and evaluating all six of each other’s statements. With
participants’ consent, this part of the procedure was recorded on
two cameras, so that both participants’ displays were captured for
the entirety of the task.
Participants were subsequently given the same VAS
measure to determine whether their anxiety levels remained
relatively constant within the induction group. Upon completion,
they completed a demographics questionnaire and a materials
release form. These measures were collected at the end of this
study rather than the beginning in order to give participants’
anxiety levels time to decrease before debriefing them on the true
purpose of the research.

99

Kimberly A. Solomon

RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive information and bivariate correlations for
the questionnaire measures and percentage of listener agreement
with speaker-assigned affect are listed in Table 1. Greater anxiety
before writing about the remembered event (T1) was associated
with greater anxiety after writing about the event (T2) and after the
interaction (T3). Additionally, greater anxiety after writing about
the event was associated with greater anxiety after the interaction.
Higher scores on BEQ Emotional Impulses were associated with
lower anxiety after writing about the remembered event. Finally,
the three subscales of the BEQ were positively correlated

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between study variables.

Questionnaire by Mood Induction
Prior to the main analyses on the relation, a series of t-tests
were used to assess for group differences in the questionnaire

Table 2. Descriptive statistics and significance tests for questionnaire measures by mood
induction.
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items on the type of remembered event. There were no differences
on any of the questionnaires for those who wrote about a serene
event compared to those who wrote about an anxiety-provoking
event (Table 2).
Affective Agreement
A series of chi-square independence tests was used to
assess the agreement between speaker-assigned and listenerrated affect. From the speaker’s perspective, the listener correctly
identified the valence of the statement similarly for positive (47%),
neutral (60%), and negative (65%) statements, c2(2) = 4.40, p =
.11. From the listener’s perspective, the listener correctly identified
positively valenced statements (80%) more often than statements
with either a neutral (47%) or a negative (51%) valence, c 2(2) =
10.45, p = .005. The percentage of agreement with the speaker’s
assigned affective valence was similar for speakers who, at the
beginning of the study, wrote about an anxious memory (63%) or a
serene memory (51%), c 2(1) = 2.27, p = .13. When accounting for
statement valence, there was no difference in agreement with the
speaker’s assigned valence for participants who had written about
a serene memory, c 2(2) = 2.27, p = .29, or for participants who
had written about an anxiety-provoking memory, c 2(1) = 2.01, p
= .67. When accounting for statement valence, listeners who had
written about a serene memory agreed with the speakers’ assigned

Figure 2. Interaction between memory and time on self-reported anxiety.
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valence similarly for positive (75%), neutral (44%), and negative
(47%) statements, c2(2) = 4.51, p = .11. However, listeners who
had written about an anxiety-provoking memory showed greater
agreement with positively (84%) valenced listeners, compared to
neutral (50%) or negative (68%) statements, c2(2) = 6.89, p = .03.

Change in Anxiety
A repeated measures ANOVA was used to test for
differences in self-reported anxiety over time (within subjects)
based on the type of remembered event (between subjects) and the
interaction between time and remembered event. The main effect of
the remembered event was not significant, F(1, 28) = 0.56, p = .46.
The main effect of time was significant F(2, 54) = 4.11, p = .02, h2 =
.04), however, it was qualified by a significant interaction with the
remembered event, F(1, 28) = 4.66, p = .01, h2= .03. The interaction
effect is illustrated in Figure 2. Tukey HSD post hoc tests indicate
that for people who wrote about a serene memory, there was a
significant decline in anxiety from the first to last assessments, t(54)
= 2.62, p = .03. For people who wrote about an anxiety-provoking
memory, there was a significant decline in anxiety from the middle
to the last assessments, t(54) = 3.00, p = .01. Prior to writing
the essay, the difference in anxiety for those who wrote about a
“serene” event compared to those who wrote about an “anxious”
event approached significance, t(28) = 1.93, p = .063.

DISCUSSION
We predicted that anxious individuals would have similar
nonverbal decoding ability to their non-anxious counterparts
regardless of statement valence. It was also predicted that anxious
individuals, when compared to their non-anxious counterparts,
would be less successful at encoding nonverbal cues. The first
hypothesis initially appears to be supported with there being no
statistically significant difference between statement valence
agreement in the assigned “anxious” and “serene” groups.
However, once each participant’s overall change in anxiety over
time is taken into account, the true significance of the findings
becomes unclear. While the levels of self-reported anxiety at the
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beginning of this study were on the verge of being significantly
different, that difference was not quite reached, and those who
reported higher levels of anxiety overall happened to be in the
assigned serene group. Additionally, while the remembered event
procedure was successful as far as participants generally reporting
stronger feelings in their assigned direction in comparison to their
beginning state, there was no significant difference in the anxiety
levels of their group at the time the interaction took place.
Furthermore, because we only have self-report data to
measure individual feelings of anxiety, and there were no significant
differences in baseline questionnaire data between groups, it is not
possible for us to know whether or not the participants in this study
are truly representative of a general sample. The way in which
participants were recruited for this study, calling for individuals
who feel as though they have trouble with public speaking, was
done to ensure that our sample would include people with varying
degrees of social anxiety. It is possible then that our sample
could just happen to include individuals who fall to the right of
the mean—higher in anxiety than average— when looking at a
standard deviation that represents the general population.
These results logically lead to one overarching question:
Does anxiety influence the encoding or decoding of affective
information? Our findings suggest that potential differences are
on the side of the decoder in the ability to identify the emotional
affect of statements accurately. Our results suggest that positively
valenced statements are more accurately agreed upon, however, it
is unclear whether that effect is because of the encoded information,
the decoded information, or a property of the dyad. Research
investigating similar aspects of nonverbal communication utilizing
a face-to-face methodology has also encountered this problem in
respect to assigning accuracy (Raymond, 2016). It is difficult in
dyadic face-to-face studies to account for individual differences
and the confounding variables they present: do errors in judging
come from an encoder being unreadable or from the decoder in a
particular interaction being generally poor at judging?
In regards to this research specifically, how much of that
individual difference can be attributed to psychological context—
anxiety—and how much is within the average scope of variability
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in communicative accuracy? Within our findings, there were
no significant differences in anxiety before the interaction task,
although both groups did experience change in anxiety during the
laboratory task. Because of the trend for people who wrote about a
serene event to be more anxious before the writing task, the role of
anxiety in the expression and perception of affective information
remains unclear. Additional analyses will focus on exploring
changes of the other emotional states (e.g., happiness, calm)
across the three phases to understand better the role of reflective
writing and participant mood and how this mood may relate to
variation in listener-speaker agreement. It will also investigate the
writing samples provided by participants during their remembered
event task, looking for emotionally latent language and potential
patterns within and between groups. We anticipate findings will
add a more complete picture of the role psychological context may
play in expressing, as well as perceiving, affective information
during face-to-face interactions.
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